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AHURI   Australian Housing and Urban Research Institute 
CFFR   Council of Federal Financial Relations 
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NAB   National Australia Bank 
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IV. Definitions 
Social and affordable housing: 
Affordable Housing:  
‘Housing that is appropriate for the needs of a range of very low to moderate income households 
and priced so that these households are also able to meet other basic living costs such as food, 
clothing, transport, medical care and education. As a rule of thumb, housing is usually considered 
affordable if it costs less than 30 percent of gross household income.’  
Social Housing:  
‘Housing that is provided for people on low incomes or with particular needs by government 
agencies or non-profit organizations.’  
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1. Brief context 
1.1. Introduction of the client 
National Australia Bank (NAB) is one of the four largest financial institutions in Australia1. With 
approximately 42,000 employees and 560,000 shareholders, it primarily operates in the 
Australian and New Zealand market and services over 12mil customers. Their competencies 
range from private to business banking, including offerings to micro, small-/ medium enterprises 
as well as global institutions2. NAB’s main competitors are Commonwealth Bank (CBA), 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) and Westpac Banking Corporation (WBC). 
NAB positions itself as the largest within the banking sector in terms of its total assets (in 2015 = 
$955,052mil). However, out of the four big banks, it is ranked last in terms of market 
capitalization (02/2016 = $65,288mil).3  
1.2. The banking sector situation in general and in Australia  
Due to the recent financial crisis, it can be assumed that globally the banking sector struggles 
with a negative image in society. Jean Rogers, the Executive Director of the Sustainability 
Accounting Standards Board, reflected this sentiment by saying ‘banks and financial sectors are 
the institutions least trusted by the U.S. society’4. There is good reason that this statement may be 
generalized for more developing markets since Ana Botín, the Executive Chairman of Santander 
                                                   
1 Gable, Michael. 2015. “Where to for the big four?” ASX, August. http://www.asx.com.au/education/investor-
update-newsletter/201508-where-to-for-the-big-four.htm.  
2 NAB. 2015. Annual Financial Report 2015, National Australia Bank. 
https://www.nab.com.au/content/dam/nabrwd/About-Us/shareholder%20centre/documents/annual-financial-report-
2015.pdf (accessed June 15, 2016). 
3 A more detailed comparison of the banks’ key figures can be found in Appendix 1. 
4 Eccles, Robert G., and George Serafeim. 2013. “Sustainability in financial services is not about being green.” 




Group and one of the most powerful female bankers in the world5 also raised the point that banks 
have to undergo a cultural change and put more focus on private customers6, thus the society. In 
order to positively boost brand image, banks have begun undertaking more social operations by 
looking into social asset classes. This includes social impact investments, which combine a 
positive social impact with diversification towards lower, but less risky returns. Diversification is 
especially important for the Australian big four banks. Analyzing the banks’ balance sheets, at 
least 50% of the banks’ total assets are estimated to be loans and 50% of the gross loans are for 
the domestic residential and commercial housing market7. Over the last decade, the Australian 
housing market has experienced a high price growth and banks have been excessively distributing 
home loans8. Thus, the banks’ health and financial stability strongly depends on their volatile 
housing mortgage portfolios and relies on the continuous increase in residential and commercial 
housing prices. However, it is unlikely that the housing market will continue to grow 
indefinitely9.  
1.3. The current client situation 
NAB has currently shown great interest in entering the market for social and affordable housing 
as an investor (in debt and/or equity)10 in order to broaden its portfolio, to react to the social 
                                                   
5 Fry, Erika. 2014. “Meet the NEW most powerful woman in banking.” Fortune, September 11. 
http://fortune.com/2014/09/11/the-most-powerful-woman-in-banking/.  
6 Neumann, Jeannette. 2015. “Banco Santander Chief Ana Botín rethinks father’s legacy.” The Wall Street Journal, 
June 10. http://www.wsj.com/articles/banco-santander-chief-ana-botin-rethinks-fathers-legacy-1433989803.  
7 View Appendix 1.  
8 ABS. 2015. Feature article: The Australian residential property market, catalogue no. 6416.0, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/6416.0Feature+Article1Sep%202015 (accessed April 
18, 2016). 
9 McKenna, Greg. 2016. “Satyajit Das: Australian banking is more vulnerable than people realise.” Business Insider 
Australia, May 30. http://www.businessinsider.com.au/satyajit-das-says-australian-banking-is-more-vulnerable-than-
people-realise-2016-5.  




pressure to improve the affordability of housing and to follow its vision in becoming the most 
respected bank in Australia and New Zealand2. Thus, the market entry goal is to diversify its 
portfolio and to improve its risk-return profile while profiting from the side effect of a more 
positive image. NAB currently runs early stage assessments of the social and affordable housing 
(SAH) market with an unspecified scope of timing and size of potential investment.  
1.4. The social and affordable housing market 
Governmental studies show a significant undersupply of SAH in Australia. Its data from January 
2016 indicate that around 975,000 low-income households face rental and mortgage housing 
stress and spend more than 30% of their income on housing costs. Additional 187,500 households 
are registered on the public and community housing waiting lists11. This significant undersupply 
warrants government action as well as engagement from the private sector, such as institutional 
investors.  
Institutional investors could help to overcome the undersupply, however, a market entry by 
institutional investors seems unattractive due to several existing market barriers like the yield gap 
or lack of scale12. To diminish these sub-market characteristics, an Affordable Housing Working 
Group was established by the Council of Federal Financial Relations (CFFR) to raise the 
discussion about possible improvement strategies in the SAH sector. The Working Group 
released an issue paper in January 2016 proposing four innovative financial models that aim to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ordable%20Housing%20Working%20Group/Submissions/PDF/National_Australia_Bank.ashx (accessed May 20, 
2016). 
11 CFFR. 2016. Affordable Housing Working Group: Issues paper, Council on Federal Financial Relations, 
Canberra. 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations%20and%20Reviews/Consultations/2016/CFFR%20Aff
ordable%20Housing%20Working%20Group/Key%20Documents/PDF/Issues_Paper.ashx (accessed April 15, 2016).  
12 AHURI. 2016a. Attracting large institutional investors for affordable housing developments. Australian Housing 
and Urban Research Institute (AHURI), Melbourne. https://www.ahuri.edu.au/policy-development/institutional-
investment (accessed May 20, 2016).  
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increase institutional investment as well as maximize the effectiveness of government 
expenditure. Four financial models were proposed: the housing cooperatives, the social impact 
bond, the housing trust and the bond/loan aggregator model11. In response, 77 stakeholders, 
including NAB, submitted their feedback and provided new suggestions with nine submissions 
labeled as confidential13. 
1.5. The business project goal 
The aim of the business project was to provide insights into the SAH markets and the four 
proposed financial models to then identify the attractiveness of the SAH sector for NAB. In the 
first part of the business project, the team conducted an analysis of Australia’s SAH sector and 
the interest and involvement of the major stakeholders. The second part of the business project 
entailed an evaluation of the four financial models proposed by the government. In order to 
unveil implications for NAB, the team analyzed advantages and disadvantages and the financial 
models’ capabilities to overcome major market entry barriers. The business project concluded by 
recommending NAB various possible courses of action.  
2. Reflection on the business project and individual contribution 
2.1. Situation in the social and affordable housing market 
In the following part, the supply and demand gap in the SAH sector will be highlighted. While 
the market experiences a lack of investment, the sector does present attractive opportunities for 
institutional investors. It may be assumed that investors primarily invest in the SAH market as a 
matter of CSR. The situation and the prevailing reasons are outlined.  
                                                   
13 Treasury. 2016. Council on Federal Financial Relations Affordable Housing Working Group – Innovative 
financing models- Submissions. http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2016/CFFR-
Affordable-Housing-Working-Group/Submissions (accessed May 20, 2016). 
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2.1.1. Supply and demand gap in the social and affordable housing market  
Over the recent decade (2005-2015) Australian rental and property prices have increased by 55% 
and 62% respectively8. The corresponding price pressure in the housing market led to a decrease 
in national housing affordability that has strongly affected low- and medium income households. 
Several factors from the demand and supply side indicate the reasons for the existing price 
pressure14,15. The increase in demand for housing was accelerated by a growing and ageing 
population, where the population is concentrated in a few large cities as well as increasing levels 
of overseas migration and foreign investment. In contrary, the supply is suppressed by the 
contract building system, the shortfall of land, imposed taxes on new housing and delays in 
providing supporting infrastructure. Therefore, the supply is not able to keep pace with the 
underlying demand of housing that currently lacks 187,500 dwellings in the SAH sector. 
Assuming that socioeconomic and demographic trends persist, the lack of SAH is expected to 
increase to 663,000 dwellings by 203116. 
To estimate the potential size of investment needed in the SAH sector, the Social Housing 
Initiative, which built 19,700 new social housing dwellings in 2012, was used as a benchmark. 
                                                   
14 Lawson, Julie., Vivienne Milligan, and Judith Yates. 2012. “Housing supply bonds – a suitable instrument to 













Taking the average cost per dwelling of $265,672 (in $2013)17 as a reference, we concluded that 
over $50bn of new investments are needed to close the existing supply and demand gap of 
187,500 dwellings. However, the potential investment scale can be expected to be even greater 
since the maintenance and renewal costs of existing SAH (approximately 400,000 dwellings) 
were not incorporated18.  
2.1.2. Undersupply of private investment via institutional investors 
Despite the potential size of the market for institutional investors, there are several barriers that 
make investing in the SAH sector unattractive. The major entry barriers are related to market 
uncertainty driven by government actions and the inefficient supply of housing by community 
housing providers. This relates to further barriers, such as the yield gap, a lack of credit rating 
and scale. 
The government plays a key role in the market as a funding party, a policy maker and an 
implementer and thus, is one of the major stakeholders from the perspective of NAB19. The 
government’s commitment to the SAH market, however, has not been consistent. The market has 
been affected by shifting policies and support from the supply side to the demand side20, a lack of 
support for large-scale attempts of private investment and a continuous reduction in 
governmental subsidies21. Altogether, this has not only increased the gap between supply and 
demand, but also increased the uncertainty in the market, which is not perceived well by 
                                                   
17 Social Housing Initiative, 2013. Fact Sheet. 
https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/.../social_housing_initiative_fact_sheet.pdf.docx (accessed April 26, 2016). 
18 Shelter WA. 2014. Housing Australia fact sheet: A quick guide to housing facts and figures. 
http://www.shelter.org.au/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=30&Itemid=127 (accessed April 
17, 2016). 
19 For a detailed overview, please refer to Appendix 2  
20 Hooker, L. Janusy. 2014. “Australia’s essential housing crisis: Collaborative solutions involving institutional 
capital & public private partnerships.” March 25. http://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=43a53e07-3a52-
4be7-b7c9-00dfa014d47d&subId=206044.  
21 For a detailed overview of government actions, please refer to Appendix 3 to 6.  
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investors. Investors cannot be certain that current government plans will be translated into future 
action due to shifts in governing parties, for instance22. In order to attract institutional investors, 
the SAH sector needs long-term commitment from the government which would help reduce 
further existing barriers.  
From NAB’s perspective, besides the government, community housing providers (CHPs) also 
play a key role. CHPs have the duty to provide living options for low- and moderate income 
households across Australia. There are currently over 200 CHPs operating in Australia with 77 
CHPs managing 32,500 tenancies in the state of New South Wales (NSW)23. In NSW, they have 
a capital base of $3bn and bank debt of $200mil in new SAH23. The CHP market is challenged by 
two factors which causes institutional investors to be reluctant to invest in the SAH market. 
Firstly, the CHP market is very fragmented which entails low level economies of scale, 
ineffective expenditure management practices and a lack of monitoring and control24. Thus, 
CHPs are generally unable to yield a competitive return. Secondly, the fragmentation of the CHP 
market and insufficient assessment frameworks do not allow investors to adequately credit rate 
CHPs. Taking international standards for credit rating as a reference, only four CHPs would be 
large enough and thus, be eligible for Moody’s rating criteria10. The lack of credit rating and the 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of CHPs lead to a lack of investment. In order to attract large-
scale investment to cover the SAH demand, structural reforms within the CHP market are 
                                                   
22 AEC. 2016. 2016 federal election timetable. http://www.aec.gov.au/election/timetable.htm (accessed May 20, 
2016). 
23 Hayhurst, Wendy. 2016. “Increasing affordable housing – How community housing providers in NSW could 
deliver more.” NSW Federation of Housing Associations, Sydney, March. 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/~/media/Treasury/Consultations and Reviews/Consultations/2016/CFFR Affordable 
Housing Working Group/Submissions/PDF/NSW_Federation_of_Housing_Associations.ashx. 
24 AHURI. 2016b. “Assessing management costs and tenant outcomes in social housing.” Australian Housing and 





needed. It is assumed that long-term government commitment and long-term investments by 
institutional investors would cause the CHPs to become more professional.  
Apart from the investors’ general limited awareness of the asset class and certain financial 
models which complicates investors’ decision making10, the following market entry barriers were 
identified by NAB and other stakeholders: 
 lack of scale: investors are required to search for their suitable ‘at-scale’ project, which 
is costly and not always available;  
 low risk-adjusted returns and the yield gap: the yield provided by the market is unable 
to meet the expectations of investors and to cover the risks. 
Overall, the uncertainty and characteristics of the SAH market do not present a basis for large-
scale investment into the market. However, there are institutional investors involved in the 
market, but they have different goals other than achieving sustainable returns. 
2.1.3. Current investment in the sector SAH aligned with social impact goals 
Investors may not generally consider the SAH market a viable asset class capable of competing 
against existing asset classes. The reason institutional investors currently invest in the market 
may be due to corporate social responsibility (CSR) goals. Out of NAB’s three biggest 
competitors, Westpac Banking Corporation is the only bank actively involved in the SAH 
sector25,26. Westpac has committed to invest $2bn by 2017; representing 0.36% of their five-year 
                                                   
25 Johanson, Simon. 2011. “Two big banks shun low-income housing.” Sydney Morning Herald, September 19. 
http://www.smh.com.au/business/property/two-big-banks-shun-lowincome-housing-20110918-1kfu3.html.  
26 For an overview of Westpac’s involvement, please refer to Appendix 7.  
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average loans of $550bn27,28. It may be assumed that Westpac does not consider their engagement 
as a ‘classical’ commercial banking practice rather as a CSR tool. Their involvement in the SAH 
sector is not only promoted in their 2013-2017 Sustainability strategy paper, but also via their 
company vision, which includes helping individuals gain SAH access27.  
The second biggest category of investors competing with NAB, representing an important source 
of investment for the SAH market29, are superannuation funds. The main funds HESTA, 
AustralianSuper and Hostplus have invested $6.7mil, $1bn and $400mil respectively30. Their 
investment is driven by the opportunity to diversify their portfolio31 and to follow their mandate 
of support their clients once they have retired32. Since the clients’ funds are not accessible until 
retirement, superfunds are able to follow long-term investment strategies with steady, yet lower 
returns.  
Given the estimated conservative investment potential of $50bn and the investment commitment 
by Westpac and superannuation funds, it is apparent that the SAH market leaves room for more 
investors, such as NAB, to enter the market. 
 
                                                   
27 Westpac. 2013a. 2013-2017 Sustainability strategy. https://www.westpac.com.au/docs/pdf/aw/sustainability-
community/2013-2017_Sustainability_Strategy.pdf (accessed May 23, 2016). 
28 Westpac. 2015. 2015 Annual report. http://www.westpac.com.au/docs/pdf/aw/ic/2015_WBC_Annual_Report.pdf 
(accessed May 23, 2016). 
29 Wu, Kevin. 2016. IBISWorld Industry Report K6330 Superannuation funds in Australia, IBISWorld (accessed 
May 12, 2016). 
30 Cranston, Matthew. 2016. “Super fund HESTA invests in Queensland social housing.” Australian Financial 
Review, January 13. http://www.afr.com/real-estate/superfund-hesta-invests-in-queensland-social-housing-
20160112-gm4o18. 
31 Milligan, Vivienne, Hal Pawson, Peter Williams, and Judith Yates. 2015. “Next moves? Expanding affordable 
rental housing in Australia through institutional investment.” University of New South Wales, Sydney, March. 
https://cityfutures.be.unsw.edu.au/documents/81/Next_moves_report.pdf.  






2.2. Four financial models proposed by the government 
In order to attract large-scale institutional investment, the Affordable Housing Working Group 
has proposed four financial models that aim to overcome existing market entry barriers and 
increase the effectiveness of government expenditure. To assess the financial models’ 
attractiveness from NAB’s perspective, the hypothesis was tested as to what extent the financial 
models were capable of overcoming the aforementioned entry barriers. The team analyzed each 
model’s advantages and disadvantages and drew implications from it. The analysis is based on 
the assumption that each model will be adequately supported by the government.  
2.2.1. Methodology 
To reach our conclusions, the methodology of the project is primarily based on secondary 
research. Based on the qualitative analysis of credible sources, such as the 68 publicly available 
submissions from interested stakeholders, research papers and relevant web documents, the team 
followed the approach of synthesizing, extracting and structuring relevant information33. 
Additionally, to prove certain assumptions and to gather further information, the team directly 
contacted and interviewed an Australian investment advisor and specialists from Westpac 
Banking Corporation and the Housing Action Network. 
2.2.2. Analysis of the four financial models 
Housing cooperatives model 
Housing cooperatives are mostly community based and non-for-profit associations that provide 
housing for their members, who usually hold ownership and control rights. This model has the 
characteristics of a delivery model rather than a financing model that is capable of attracting 
                                                   
33 Mayring, Philipp. 2010. Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken, 11th ed., Beltz Verlag, 
Weinheim and Basel. 
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large-scale institutional investment. Therefore, the housing cooperatives model seems 
unattractive for NAB. However, it is perceived to be more efficient in delivering SAH than other 
models described below as it reduces welfare dependency34 and costs of management35. To allow 
the SAH sector to profit from these efficiencies, it may be beneficial to introduce the housing 
cooperatives as a potential delivery model under the financing model that will be established in 
the future.36  
Social impact bond model 
The social impact bond model is a new and innovative social impact investing product that first 
was launched in the UK in 201037. The cooperation of private investors, public authorities and 
social service providers aim to achieve a certain social impact on society.  
Figure 1: The mechanism of social impact bonds 
Source: own elaboration based on Hughes and Scherer 2014 and Arosio 2011. 
While social service providers are responsible for delivering social results, the investors provide 
the funding for the project. In the case that the agreed social targets are successfully met, the 
                                                   
34 Sousa, Jorge, and Jack Quarter. 2004. “Converting a public housing project into a tenant-managed housing co-
operative: A Canadian case study.” Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 19 (2): 187-198. 
35 Anderson, George. D. 1992. “Housing policy in Canada” lecture series, Centre for Human Settlements, 
University of British Columbia for Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, Vancouver. 
36 For more detailed information on the model, please refer to Appendix 8.  




government repays the investors their principal at a certain interest rate depending on the level of 
success38. Therefore, the investors bare the risk of default and inefficiency in delivering the 
specific social impact. Due to the fragmentation of the CHP sector, the ability of effective and 
efficient delivery may be questionable in the SAH market. In addition, assessment of the CHPs 
by investors is time-consuming due to their lack of credit rating. This and the fact that the social 
impact bonds must be held until maturity39, lowering the liquidity in the market, display a greater 
risk than the expected return may cover. Taking the Rough Sleepers £5mil Bond in the UK as an 
example, investors were required to wait three years to achieve a 6.5% return p.a. but only in the 
case that the social targets were met40. The results of this bond are not yet published. 
Overall, the social impact bond model is a niche product, because it is not capable of overcoming 
the major barriers and does not have a significant impact on the housing supply. For NAB, 
investing in social impact bonds may be a CSR activity, but it is generally too costly and time-
intensive given the scale, the risk profile and the potential return.41 
Housing trust model 
The housing trust aggregates housing assets at state/national level and thus, attracts large-scale 
institutional investment. It enables a total capital solution, since investors are able to invest in the 
trust either with debt and/or equity or even purchase housing units11.  
                                                   
38 Hughes Jane, and Jill Scherer. 2014. “Foundations for social impact bonds.” Social Finance, 2014. 
http://www.payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/social_finance_white_paper_2014.pdf.  
39 SVA. 2015. “Is your program suitable for a social impact bond.” Social Ventures Australia, June 8. 
http://www.socialventures.com.au/sva-quarterly/is-your-program-suitable-for-a-social-impact-bond/. 
40 Department for Communities and local Government. 2015. “Qualitative evaluation of the London 
homelessness social impact bond - Second interim report.” OGL, March. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414787/Qualitative_evaluation_of_the
_London_homelessness_SIB.pdf.  
41 For more detailed information on the model, please refer to Appendix 9. 
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Figure 2: The mechanism of the Housing trust 
 
Source: CFFR 2016. 
CHPs are the members of the trust and transfer housing stock to the trust. Specialized tenancy 
and property managers manage the operations and thus, hold responsibility to yield returns for 
the trust. Due to management being outsourced, it may be assumed that the housing trust 
increases efficiencies in the CHP operations. Furthermore, the aggregation of stock allows better 
liquidity and portfolio diversification. However, there is a general concern that the model is not 
capable of overcoming barriers, such as risk-adjusted returns and scale, which makes this 
aggregator model inferior to the bond/loan aggregator model described below. In case the 
housing trust reaches a AAA credit rating due to full guarantees made by the government, 
investing in the trust would be attractive since it may yield a higher return of around 4% 
compared to ‘classical’ government bonds with the same risk profile42.43 
                                                   
42 RBA. 2016. Chart pack – Interest rates Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney. http://www.rba.gov.au/chart-
pack/interest-rates.html (accessed May 13, 2016).  
43 For more detailed information on the model, please refer to Appendix 10. 
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Bond/loan aggregator model 
The Bond/loan aggregator is a model that aggregates debt financing and additionally allows 
housing providers to aggregate and combine financial needs via a specially established 
intermediary11. The intermediary, which exchanges bonds for financing, pools together both  
Figure 3: The mechanism of the Bond/loan aggregator model 
supply and demand and thus, enables scaling and 
liquidity in the market and makes it accessible for 
all parties. This and the fact that both the bonds as 
well as the intermediary may be credit rated 
decreases the cost of capital for investors and 
thus, the yield gap23,44. 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Hayhurst 2016. 
Since investors may invest in more secure housing cash-flows at scale rather than equity, this 
leaves CHPs dependent on existing growth mechanisms such as stock transfers or subsidies10. 
This implies that contrary to the housing trust, the bond/loan aggregator model does not 
incentivize the CHP sector to become more efficient. Thus, from the supply side perspective, this 
model does not encourage decreasing the yield gap.  
Overall, the model is perceived to be less resource consuming and more capable of attracting 
institutional investment since barriers such as scale, yield gap and lack of credit rating may be 
                                                   






overcome. Investing in SAH bonds would be a ‘classical’ financial instrument with clear 
regulations familiar to NAB. In comparison to the other models described above, NAB would 
profit from a shorter decision making process of investing in the market.45 
2.3. Conclusion and recommendations 
Based on our research, we concluded that out of the four models proposed by the government, the 
bond/loan aggregator model is the model most capable of overcoming the major market entry 
barriers, such as the yield gap, the scale and credit rating and is most attractive for large-scale 
institutional investors. However, choosing the right financial model is only part of the equation to 
promote supply in the SAH sector. Research highlights that long-term and consistent government 
commitment and a higher efficiency level of the CHP market are the most important factors in 
determining the supply of investment to the SAH sector. 
Drawing on the importance of long-term and consistent government policies, two illustrative 
examples from the US and the Netherlands support this conclusion. Firstly, the US established 
the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) model46 in 1987 that has evolved to become the 
prevailing model for developing social housing in the US47. After the Congress made the LIHTC 
a permanent law in 1993, robust investment flowed into the housing market leading to the 
development of 2.6mil low income housing units by 201348,49. Secondly, the Netherlands 
managed to eliminate homelessness through developing SAH, which constitutes around 30% of 
the national housing stock. Instead of the government covering the total supply costs, it has only 
                                                   
45 For more detailed information on the model, please refer to Appendix 11. 
46 For more detailed information on the model, please refer to Appendix 12. 
47 Nolden, Sandra, Clarissa Climaco, and Meryl Finkel. 2000. Updating the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) Database, Final Report, Abt Associates Inc., Cambridge, MA. 
48 2016, pers. comm, 24 May 
49 HUD User. 2015. Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
Washington DC. https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/lihtc.html (accessed May 13, 2016).  
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provided a 100% guarantee to private investors against the default of borrowers, e.g. CHPs. The 
SAH sector profited from extreme influx of funds and managed to reach a default rate of zero for 
its loans20.  
We concluded that investing in the SAH sector results in many uncertainties for institutional 
investors, such as NAB. However, there are several proposed courses of action that NAB may 
follow until further development occurs in this sector:  
Engage in industry discussions: there are currently ongoing government-led discussions to 
encourage stakeholders to explore possible courses of action to increase the sector’s supply. It is 
recommended that NAB should actively participate in industry discussions, such as roundtable 
discussions and lobbying, to reach a desirable outcome.  
Evaluate and participate the current government initiative: there are currently governmental 
backed initiatives, such as the Social and Affordable Housing Fund in NSW50, that provide 
possibilities for NAB to acquire knowledge and expertise about the market in a low-risk 
environment.  
Explore the potential of being an intermediary by issuing a bond in the SAH sector: drawing 
on NAB’s expertise of being an intermediary in impact bonds, e.g. NAB’s climate bond51, a 
possible avenue for NAB may be to act as an intermediary and cooperate with CHPs to build a 
‘Social Housing Bond’. NAB’s role would be to launch the bond and help CHPs to find potential 
investors.  
                                                   
50 FACS. 2016. Social and Affordable Housing Fund, Department of Family and Community Services, NSW 
Government, Sydney. http://www.facs.nsw.gov.au/reforms/social-housing/SAHF (accessed May 20, 2016).  
51 NAB. 2016b. Impact investment, National Australia Bank, Melbourne. http://www.nab.com.au/about-
us/corporate-responsibility/our-programs-and-initiatives/social-and-financial-inclusion/impact-investment (accessed 
May 20, 2016).  
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Create an internal credit rating framework: it might be in NAB’s best interest to create an 
internal credit framework to assess potential borrowers, e.g. CHPs. Since credit ratings are 
currently lacking, NAB might profit from the first-mover advantages in the future.  
Scope for future research: until the government gives clear indication of which model will be 
chosen, NAB might further evolve its understanding about the markets and financial models 
proposed in the interim period. NAB might draw on the report as a basis to undertake further and 
deeper research.  
2.4. Shortcomings of the report 
The methodology of this report and subsequently the recommendations provided entail 
limitations. Firstly, using secondary research only, the report lacked the practical part of financial 
modelling that might have provided clearer indications, e.g. the risk/return profile of the four 
financial models. Since deep financial analysis is missing, the team was not able to include 
recommendations on whether to enter the market or not and on which entry mode is most 
recommended. Thus, the team was only able to analyze the stakeholders’ tendencies towards 
certain models and through this provide an understanding of which model might be the most 
capable of overcoming entry barriers, making it the most attractive model from an investor’s 
perspective. Furthermore, the analysis neither incorporated CSR strategies nor macroeconomic 
uncertainties, such as the evolvement and stability of the Australian housing market in general52. 
Moreover, the recommendations are based on the assumption that NAB keeps its strategies and 
interest in entering the SAH market regardless of the challenges encountered.  
                                                   





2.5. Individual contribution  
The business project can be categorized as a research project since it missed a practical part and 
relevant company insights. Thus, the team found itself reorganizing and summarizing publicly 
available information. The major part of the qualitative analysis were the 68 submissions that 
provided feedback on the issue paper of the Affordable Housing Working Group. I was extracting 
information from 15 randomly selected submissions and developed the input table to structure the 
data that allowed us to draw comparisons. After the team synthesized the key findings of all 68 
submissions, we worked to acquire further knowledge about the four financial models and the 
SAH market. I was responsible for the social impact bond model which incorporated developing 
a deep understanding of its advantages, disadvantages and the potential implications for NAB. 
Referring to national and overseas examples was part of this role. In addition, I was co-
responsible for analyzing the current involvement of institutional investors in the SAH sector to 
draw conclusions in regards to the competitive landscape for NAB.  
Since the team dealt with information sourced from many different credible sources, it was 
important to keep the bigger picture in order to submit a cohesive and clear message. Thus, I was 
actively involved in prioritizing the models according to which NAB might find the most 
attractive. Furthermore, I assisted in defining the major entry barriers for such large-scale 
investment. This allowed me to not only write the introduction sections, but also to co-write the 
overall implications of the four models, recommendations and conclusion. Furthermore, in 
regards to the presentation of the business project, I was responsible for the storyline and the 
logical flow of all slides, which allowed me to keep the presentation master file and to co-work 




3. Academic Discussion  
When deciding on policies to reduce the supply and demand gap in the SAH sector, 
governmental policies may also take possible effects of residential segregation into consideration. 
Residential segregation is defined as ‘uneven residential distributions of individuals or 
households’53 and is a phenomenon that is persistent around the world. While the issue is less 
pronounced in Australia54, it is more tangible in selected European countries, such as France55 or 
the UK56 and prevails in the US57.  
3.1. Reasons and effects of segregation 
Segregation is not only driven by historical incidences, such as the discrimination of migrants 
(e.g. African Americans in the US) being restricted to live in certain areas only57.There is an 
ongoing academic debate about the impact of various dimensions that may cause segregation. 
The different perspectives include the discrimination in the housing market58, historical and 
current governmental policies, economic factors57 and personal preferences59. In fact, research 
shows that historical racial segregation is the predominant driver of separation by income level60. 
Thus, the crowding out effect of lower-income households from metropolitan cities to the 
                                                   
53 Clapham, David F., William A.V. Clark, and Kenneth Gibb. 2012. The SAGE Handbook of housing studies. 
London: SAGE Publications. 
54 Johnston, Ron, Michael Poulsen, and James Forrest. 2007. “The geography of ethnic residential segregation: A 
comparative study of five countries.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 97 (4): 713-738. 
55 Préteceille, Edmond. 2007. “Is gentrification a useful paradigm to analyse social changes in Paris metropolis?” 
Environment and Planning A, 39: 10-31.  
56 Musterd, Sako. 2011. “The impact of immigrants’ segregation on social integration in selected European 
contexts.” Documents d’Anàlisi Geogràfica, 57 (3): 359-380. 
57 Turner, Margery A. and Karina Fortuny. 2009. “Residential segregation of low-income working families.” The 
Urban Institute Paper 10.   
58 Musterd, Sako. 2005. “Social and ethnic segregation in Europe: Levels, causes, and effects.” Journal of Urban 
Affairs, 27 (3): 331-348. 
59 Clark, William A.V. 2009. “Changing residential preferences across income, education, and age: Findings from a 
multi-city study of urban inequality.” Urban Affairs Review, 44 (3): 334-355. 
60 Massey, Douglas S. 2001. “Residential Segregation and Neighborhood Conditions in U.S. Metropolitan Areas.” 
In America becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences, ed. Smelser, Neil J., William J. Wilson, and Faith 
Mitchell, 391–434. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
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suburbs as a result of rising real house prices61 not only causes a concentration of poverty62, but 
also of foreign migrants63.  
There is academic consensus that ethnic residential segregation impacts the residents living in the 
enclaves and society. However, the discussion about the direction of impact either being positive 
or negative is still ongoing. Academic disunity regarding this topic exists for two main reasons. 
Firstly, there are challenges related to the methodology and to the high demand for sufficient data 
quality to discard bias53. Secondly, empirical results regarding the effects of segregation have 
revealed high dependencies on the quality of the existing national welfare system64 and the 
degree of urban ethnic diversity54. Additionally, the function of neighborhood interactions 
affecting the so called neighborhood effects also play a role in defining the impact of segregation 
on the residents and society65. 
While ethnic residential segregation may promote the development of urban areas via ethnic 
entrepreneurship, which positively impacts society and the economy66, research to the contrary 
highlighted a relation between ethnic poverty concentrated areas and crime, social decay53 and a 
higher likelihood of residents to drop out of school and remain unemployed long-term67. 
                                                   
61 Gyourko, Joseph, Christopher Mayer, and Todd Sinai. 2006. “Superstar Cities.” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 12355.  
62 Kneebone, Elizabeth. 2014. “The growth and spread of concentrated poverty, 2000 to 2008-2012.” Brookings 
Institution Research Brief, July 31. http://www.brookings.edu/research/interactives/2014/concentrated-
poverty#/M10420.  
63 Del Pero, Angelica S., Willem Adema, Valeria Ferraro, and Valérie Frey. 2016. “Policies to promote access to 
good-quality affordable housing in OECD countries.” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 
No.176.  
64 Wacquant, Loïc. 2008. Urban Outcasts: A comparative sociology of advanced marginality. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press. 
65 Galster, George, Roger Andersson, Sako Musterd, and Timo M. Kauppinen. 2008. “Does neighborhood 
income mix affect earnings of adults? New evidence from Sweden.” Journal or Urban Economics, 63: 858-870. 
66 Kloosterman, Robert, and Jan Rath. 2003. Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Venturing abroad in the age of 
globalization. Oxford: Berg. 
67 Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1998. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the 
underclass, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
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Therefore, the concentrated disadvantage may also have an impact on the residents, on the 
society and the economy as well as on the region that lacks sustainable development and 
growth62.  
3.2. Governmental policies 
Instead of weighing the positive and negative effects of segregation against one another, the 
government mostly focusses on the negative side effects. Their predominant fear is the 
development of ‘parallel societies’53 that may perpetuate poverty and its negative effects on the 
society and the economy across generations. For this reason, established governmental policies 
aim to reduce the level of segregation and to build mixed-tenure neighborhoods. For example, the 
US government has launched the HOPE VI project that amongst others aims to promote ‘placing 
public housing in non-poverty neighborhoods’68. The same approach has been followed in France 
through the SRU Housing Act that requires most French communes to increase social housing to 
at least 20% of their housing stock by 202069. With these policies in place, the governments 
expect improvements in poverty alleviation, housing quality and in low-income households’ lifes 
in regards to increased life chances70. However, there are also governments (e.g. in Germany), 
that have favored mixed neighborhoods, but whose internal debate about social housing is 
shifting towards the positive effects of segregation71. The research, disclosing the inefficacy of 
social mixed-tenure neighborhoods and the positive effects of segregation72, argues that ethnic 
                                                   
68 HUD.GOV. 2016. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/hope6/about 
(accessed June 10, 2016).  
69 Blanc, Maurice. 2010. “The impact of social mix policies in France.” Housing Studies, 25 (2): 257-272. 
70 Levy, Barry S., and Victor W. Sidel. 2013. Social injustice and public health. 2nd ed. Oxford: University Press.  
71 Scanlon, Kathleen, Melissa Fernández Arrigoitia, and Christine M.E. Whitehead. 2014. Social Housing in 
Europe. London: John Wiley & Sons.  




concentration serves as a starting point for most immigrants entering a foreign country and as a 
base to get economic, social and emotional support73. It is also found that segregation creates a 
safer environment for residents to be less exposed to discrimination74. 
It may be assumed that the ideal form of social mixed-tenure neighborhoods is not based on 
empirical results, but on conviction75. It may additionally be argued that the policies favoring 
mixed tenure are used more as a tool to shift the political focus away from racial integration 
policies that may effectively reduce the negative effects76.  
3.3. Research gap 
In order to further explore the issue of segregation and its consequences, it is important to explore 
the balance of positive and negative effects of segregation from a country perspective due to 
existing dependencies, such as the welfare system. The focus shall lie on countries that are more 
affected by the phenomenon. As a consequence, an analysis of the effectiveness of both the 
unintended and intended social and economic consequences of policies shall be conducted using 
a more longitudinal approach. This allows the analysis to avoid biases related to, for instance, 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics. The research shall provide a handbook for social 
policy makers to make an informed decision on the right policies (e.g. SAH policies) to address 
the negative effects of segregation.  
                                                   
73 Zorlu, Aslan, and Clara H. Mulder. 2008. “Initial and subsequent location choices of immigrants to the 
Netherlands.” Regional Studies, 42 (2): 245-264. 
74 Logan, John R., Wenquan Zhang, and Richard D. Alba. 2002. “Immigrant enclaves and ethnic communities in 
New York and Los Angeles.” American Sociological Review, 67 (2): 299-322. 
75 Graham, Elspeth, David Manley, Rosemary Hiscock, Paul Boyle, and Joe Doherty. 2009. “Mixing housing 
tenures: Is it good for social well-being?” Urban Studies, 46 (1): 139-165. 
76 Goetz, Edward. 2003. Clearing the way. Deconcentrating the poor. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press.  
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4. Personal Reflection  
After having experienced some challenges with the business project over the last three months, it 
is time to discover the hidden value of reflection. Reflection is important, because it not only 
impacts mental health and creativity, but it also provides the possibility to learn from experience 
and improve personal effectiveness77. The following entails an analysis of personal 
characteristics that became salient during the project, the role within my team and areas for 
personal improvement. 
4.1. Emergence of personal characteristics 
The business project had a very slow start due to some challenges with the client, which 
ultimately led to a high level of discomfort caused by uncertainty around the scope. I was slightly 
concerned about the client’s lack of clarity and commitment during the initial scope definition 
phase. For instance, the client was not always promptly available when their input was crucial to 
define and finalize the scope of the project. This incidence delayed the actual start of the project 
by six weeks. Even our mentor from the university felt the urge to become more active and 
discussed several options with the CEMS unit coordinator, e.g. changing the client, the topic or 
the client’s representative. After the scope was finally defined and agreed upon, I felt comfortable 
again given that we had a clear and achievable scope. Our CEMS unit coordinator additionally 
emphasized she would consider the circumstances when comparing the outcome and depth of our 
report to the other teams’ output. A situation like this reveals that I feel uncomfortable if the 
success of my work depends on other’s input and therefore remains outside of my influence.  
                                                   
77 Kets de Vries, Manfred.F.R. 2014. “Doing nothing and nothing to do: The hidden value of empty time and 
boredom.” Faculty Research Working Paper, Insead.  
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Furthermore, during the course of the business project, I realized that I always try to maximize 
the output, which may occasionally result in my impatience. I was impatient with certain team 
members, because several indicators reflected different levels of commitment. While one team 
member only wanted to exert the level of effort into the business project that equaled the amount 
of ECTS gained, another team member refused to sacrifice any time on the weekend, regardless 
of the amount of work outstanding. The reason for the different levels of commitment derive 
from the different levels of intrinsic motivation, different prioritization (travelling vs. working for 
the business project) and different incentives.  
Additionally, the preference of working efficiently became salient. This was apparent due to 
increased levels of frustration when valuable time was wasted as a result of an insufficient 
structure. For instance, team meetings were inefficient when team members showed up late or not 
at all due to other commitments. However, when the deadline was approaching, increasing level 
of extrinsic motivation meant the team continuously increased its level of cooperation. This 
allowed us to get to know each other’s strengths and weaknesses, which increased the level of 
trust and efficiency and eventually caused the richness of our project. From this experience, I 
have realized I am a very organized and self-disciplined person who prefers a clear schedule and 
who creates personal deadlines. 
4.2. My role in the team and my contribution to the team 
In the face of external challenges, e.g. with the client, I stepped up to become one of the more 
dominant team members who decided on the direction the business project would take. For 
instance, I assigned myself as the project leader. The first reason for this was that the team neither 
discussed nor appointed a team leader. Secondly, I was unsatisfied with the initial level of 
commitment and concerned about the situation with the client. Furthermore, I did not see the 
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possibility of getting any external support from the client or the mentor to help align the different 
levels of engagement. Finally, achieving outstanding results was important for me in order to 
additionally have a great basis for my Work Project. Thus, I found myself in a position taking on 
the following tasks: I set up a timeline with milestones and deadlines in agreement with my team 
members and tried to make sure the deadlines were met. I organized team meetings and made 
sure everyone would be available. Furthermore, I was active in seeking updates in regards to 
interactions with the client and the mentor in order to proceed as quickly and efficiently as 
possible. Furthermore, I proposed team dinners in order to enhance the team spirit. 
Throughout the process, I was able to further develop my ability to organize teams and team 
meetings and to engage everyone in the team while taking into consideration different opinions. 
From a contextual perspective, I further developed my ability to not get stuck in the research 
stage or minor details, but to focus on the overall goal of the project.  
4.3. Areas of personal improvement 
I learned to remain calm despite the external challenges, which were out of our control. I 
additionally learned to be more patient with my team members and accept that students may have 
different underlying motivations. If I were to start this project again, I would try to be more 
relaxed, patient and optimistic in regards to the final outcome. Furthermore, I would encourage 
my team to meet more often outside of university in order to get to know each other’s personality 
as soon as possible. This might have helped to enable us to collaborate better and become a more 
cohesive team, better at dealing with external challenges. Finally, from the beginning I would try 
to be a more active project leader that builds organizational structures.  
Overall, I am glad for the experience I gained throughout the business project and I am convinced 




Appendix 1: Competitive Landscape of NAB 
Sources: NAB 2015, CBA 2015, ANZ 2015, WBC 2015.  
Appendix 2: Government impact on the SAH market 






Innovative design and building concepts. N/A Low 
Financing costs Interest rate subsidy. Commonwealth Medium 





Enable management rights to be transferred. State Medium 
Planning 
regulations 
Include 10-15% affordable housing inclusion in 
zoning regulations. 
State Medium 
Income support Commonwealth rental assistance indexed to 
market rent. 
Commonwealth Medium 
Tax incentive Put appropriate rental assistance scheme in 
place. Built on NRAS model. 
Commonwealth High 






Title transfer of social housing to CHPs with 
leverage commitments. 
State High 
Source: Peacock 2016. 
Competitive Landscape
2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014 2015 2014
Market Cap A$m 02/2016: 65,288 02/2016: 126,734 02/2016: 67,523 03/2016: 104, 026
Risk-weighted assets 399,758 368,721 337715 401,937 358,580
Total Assets 955,052 883,301 873,446 791,451 889,900 772,100 812,156 770,842
Loans and advances 532,784 434,725 646,172 608,127 570,238 521,752 623,316 580,343
Total Liabilities 899,539 835,393 820,453 742,103 832,500 722,800 758,241 721,505
Equity 55,513 47,908 52,993 49,348 57,400 49,300 53,915 49,337
Profit before income tax expense 9,080 7,782 12,612 11,997
Total Gross loans 537,165 432,307 646,172 608,127 572,370 524,383 626,344 583,516
Housing Loans 341,965 311,188 422,851 399,685 300,468 271,388 414,199 386,502
% Housing of Total 0.64 0.72 0.65 0.66 0.52 0.52 0.66 0.66
% gross loans of total assets 0.56 0.49 0.74 0.77 0.64 0.68 0.77 0.76
NAB CBA ANZ WBC
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Appendix 3: Government policy changes over time 
1950 The dwellings were allocated to households who cannot afford non-rebated rent. 
1970s Income eligibility and rent ceiling were introduced. 
1980s State housing authorities devolved part of their responsibilities to non-government organizations. 
The local government community-housing program was introduced.  
Early 1990s The commonwealth government called for greater housing choice for low-income households 
and promoted community housing. 
End of 1990s The commonwealth government shifted its focus more on demand-side assistance. 
Recent The key focus has been shifted from providing community housing to delivering affordable 
housing in accessible locations in private partnership. 
Source: SGS 2016. 
Appendix 4: Government expenditure on the affordable housing services 
(in $mil) 2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 
National Affordable Housing SPP 1305.8 1324.1 1345.2 1366.8 1388.6 
National Partnership Payments 
First Home Owners Boost -0.6     
Homelessness 126.7 115 115   
Northern Territory (Remote Aboriginal 
investment, Remote Australia strategies) 
 56 49.7 50.9 3.6 
Remote Indigenous housing 485.6 363.1 406.5 361.9  
Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory 
Housing 
55.9     
Total 1973.3 1858.1 1916.5 1779.5 1392.2 
Source: Australian Government 2015. 
Appendix 5: Current social housing initiatives by the federal government 
Federal government initiatives Commencement date Scope 
Commonwealth rent 
assistance 
1991 $4.35bn raised for the 2014–15 financial year. 
National rental affordable 
scheme 
2008 73 participants have been approved in 2015 and 2016. 
National and affordable 
housing agreement 
01/01/2009 provides $6.2bn worth of housing assistance to low and 
middle income Australians in the first five years. 
Housing affordability fund 30/06/2012 16 projects have been approved for in total $113M 
funding. 
Sources: DSS 2016, Australian Government 2015. 
Appendix 6: Government and private sector one-off partnership projects 
Name Location Partners Record 
City West Housing 
Company Pty.Ltd. 
Sydney inner-west Funded by the NSW and Federal government and 
private developer contributions. 
600 medium 
density units 
Brisbane Housing Brisbane’s inner Government provides the tax incentives and allows 600 
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Company Pty.Ltd. and middle suburbs access to limited private debt finance. dwellings 
City of Port Phillip Melbourne The city in conjunction with a community housing 
organization (the Port Phillip Housing Association) 






Canberra Housing provider with private equity partner City 
Edge. 
123 units 
Source: AHURI 2004. 
Appendix 7: Westpac’s involvement in the SAH market 
Funding PPP (Public 
Private Partnerships) 
 
The Bonnyrigg PPP project aims at refurbishing a residential area in the Western 
Sydney suburb. The project was awarded to the consortium in which Westpac is part in 
October 2006.  
Completion of Social 
Impact Bond 
Westpac issued the second social impact bond in Australia. The bond has a size of 
$10mil and it is aimed at keeping at-risk families intact. 
Cash flow lending 
solution for CHPs 
Loans that initially are interest only and later transform into servicing interest and 
capital. 
Securitization  A model in which loans are transformed into liquid marketable securities.  
Lending to CHPs 
 
In October 2014 Westpac signed the largest single community finance deal with a 
provision of $61mil in debt finance. The funds are employed for 275 dwellings in the 
Sydney Metropolitan Area. 
Sources: NSW Department of Housing 2007, Westpac 2016, Westpac 2013b.  
Appendix 8: Housing cooperatives model 
Three existing sub-models under the Housing cooperatives 
Full-equity cooperatives Shared-equity cooperatives  Non-equity rental model 
 Funding is directly from the 
members. 
 Independent of the public 
housing sector. 
 No room for institutional 
investors 
 Funding can be from both 
public and private funds. 
 Restrictions on the resale of 
the shares in cooperatives. 
 Independent of the public 
housing sector. 
 Similar to renting and more sustainable. 
 Only some tenants pay reduced monthly 
rent geared to the income. 
 Members are not owners 
 Offers the highest rental yield among 
the three types. 





Efficiency  Increased tenant control over the decision-making practices of their 
community. 
 Home security enhanced. 
 Welfare dependency for government is reduced. 
Disadvantages Reason 
Risk adjusted returns and 
yield gap 
 Not much space for commercial investors. 
 The funding is generated mostly from the government. 
 Uncertainty at the service delivery level will affect the rate of return. 
Low liquidity  The units cannot be sold on the open market. 
Default risk  Relatively high likelihood of the debtor's default. 
Scale  Usually comes up in small scale to accommodate specific social problems. 
Sources: Sousa and Quarter 2004, AHURI 2010. 
Appendix 9: Social impact bond model 
Goal of the SIB  To access private capital in order to prevent or tackle social problems at an early stage.  
 To align private capital to social measurable results.  
Stakeholders  Collaboration between investors, public authorities, an intermediary and social service 
providers.  
SIBs mechanism  The government decides on a social problem. 
 An intermediary is placed whose purpose is to manage the fund by acting between the 
government, investors and the service providers.  
 Investors provide private capital. 
 Non-profit service providers work together with the defined target population to tackle the 
defined social issue.  
 The government eventually repays the principal plus an agreed rate of return in case the 
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social outcomes are met (measured by an independent evaluator).  
Specific for 
investors  
 The government is not obliged to pay anything if the social targets are not met. 
 Investors bear the risk of default, the risk of wrong measurement techniques and ineffective 
service providers.  
 Investors are not secured by any hard assets or cash flows.  
 It is important for investors that service providers have a track record that shows their 
ability to manage the operations successfully.  
 Investors need assurance that the independent evaluator measures and collects data 
correctly.  
Market size  Estimated present market size at around US$25bn. 
 Expected to constitute up to 1% of global assets (around US$500bn) by 2020. 




 Benefits are mostly related to enhancing CSR. NABs commitment to society and 
concrete social results achieved by their involvement could be promoted via various 
channels.  
Diversification  Only minor diversification due to strong correlations between the SAH and the private 
housing market. 
Disadvantages Reason 
Low rate of 
return 
Disadvantages are related to the commercialization of the SIBs: 
 the return is perceived as too low given the amount and the required waiting time for 
returns; 




 investors bear higher costs of due diligence due to different deal economics and lower fit 
of social impact projects within the existing asset allocation framework; 
 investors need to be compensated for the lack of credit rating and liquidity. SIBs are not 




 The return of investment is dependent on the effectiveness of the social service provider 
in achieving their social goals in a market environment that is fragmented and inefficient. 
Low levels of 
sustainability 
 Low replicability, scalability and high dependency on philanthropists and government. 
Since the setup of each SIB is expensive, complex and time-consuming, SIBs are unable 
to substantially increase the supply of housing. 
Early stage eco-
system 
 Only low awareness by large-scale bonds, lack of a track record and limited pipeline of 
projects whose cost savings can be measured according to SIB requirements. 
Long-term 
commitment 
 The requested long-term commitment to social projects might not fit within the 
investment time horizon. 
Sources: WEF 2013, Rose 2013. 
Appendix 10: Housing trust model 
Advantages Reason 
Liquidity  Investing in the trust provides better liquidity compared to investing directly into the 
properties. 
Flexibility  This model is applicable to various real estate asset classes, i.e. commercial, residential, 
social housing, etc. 
 The housing trust can be privately-held or listed. 
Diversification  This model enables a portfolio with broad geographic spread, which allows diversification 
and reduces geographic risk. 
 Numerous studies in Australia and overseas indicated the performance and portfolio 
optimization of housing assets in a mixed-asset portfolio, which would attract institutional 
investors who wish to diversify. 
Outsourced  Australian institutional investors view “management by experienced manager” as the most 
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operations desirable feature of an investment vehicle in housing. 
 In this model, the property and tenancy management is outsourced to professional property 
managers, thus relieving the trust from tenancy risks and driving cost efficiencies. 
Increasing 
scale 
 This model allows an aggregation of housing assets which increases the scale. 
 However, it is still not sufficiently large to attract institutional investors relative to the 




 The aggregation of affordable housing assets into a trust does not remove the submarket 
characteristics that are currently prevalent in the housing assets owned by the State and 
CHPs. 
 This is highlighted in the US model (HPET), where the rate of return is 1.32% over 3 years. 
Lack of scale  Large discrepancy of ‘at-scale’ CHPs between Australia and USA (30 vs 100 respectively). 
Capacity  Affordable housing comprises a small proportion of the housing assets. 
 The capacity of the bond/loan aggregator bond model (Model 1) is superior to the housing 
trust (Model 2). 
 From an overseas comparison, the US HPET (Model 2) is outperformed by the UK THFC 
(Model 1). The HPET achieved only c. 1500 dwellings in 3 years and in contrast, THFC 
(Model 1) achieved 43000 dwellings in a year. 
Credit rating  This model does not address the barrier of credit rating, as none of the Australian CHPs are 
rated by credit agencies. 
 There is no credit rating framework for CHPs and housing trusts in place in Australia. 
Sources: Compass Housing 2016, NAB 2016, CFFR 2016. 
Appendix 11: Bond/loan aggregator model 
Element of the model Explanation 
Bonds  Privately-issued bonds with a government guarantee. Not government-issued bonds. 
Intermediary role  Attracts funding in return for social housing bonds and plays an essential market-
maker role. Might be the government, a NFP, or a private-sector entity. A subject to 
appropriate regulations and due diligence. 
38 
 
CHP role  The model allows CHPs to pool debt to issue sizable and repeatable transactions. 
Investment type  Investment in stable cash-flow, not equity or property. 
 Bonds are straightforward debt agreements that match their underlying assets (bricks 
and mortar), and stable cash-flow (i.e. rent payments, which in social housing market 
usually are secure federal welfare payments).  
Source: Hayhurst 2016. 
Advantages Reason 
Scale  Aggregates demand and supply for financing. Investors can flexibly decide on the size 
of the investment without the need to search for appropriate project size (given the 
sufficient volume and frequency of bonds' issuance). 
 Attracts institutional and retail investors by increasing the financing inflow into the 
sector. 
Relatively low risk 
profile 
 The government will be the guarantor for the social housing bond against default as 
well as will support low-income renters by subsidies. 
 Introduction of a reserve fund for the intermediary/ the collateralization of borrowers. 
 Design of the model also allows for more diligence and greater transparency for all 
the stakeholders involved – investors, government and public. 
 Extensive experience in implementation of the model overseas. Tried and tested 
models and best practices exist. 
Accessibility and 
liquidity 
 Bonds are well-known and a relatively simple financial instrument and can be 
purchased by a wide range of institutions and are easily accessible by all parties. 
 Accessible for wide range of housing providers – CHPs, non-for-profit organizations, 
etc. 
 Bonds can also be traded on financial markets that increases the liquidity of the 
investment. 
Lower cost of 
capital 
 Scale, accessibility, liquidity, negotiation burden and cyclical credit availability 
lowers the costs of financing. 
 Recurrent subsidy to support government backed bonds yields is expected to be lower 
than that for the yield gap of the Model 2. 
 Longer tenor. 
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 Various projects are pooled and therefore diversifies the risk and decreases the 
required rate of return by investors. 
Stability  The aggregator nature of the Model 1 allows to shift from small-scale volatile 




 Model does not encourage equity participation in the sector, which is believed to be 
sub-optimal solution, as it leaves CHPs being dependent on existing mechanisms for 
growth -- stock transfers, capital grants and subsidies. 
No incentives for 
governmental long-
term commitment 
 The design and launch of the model do neither require nor incentivize long-term 
commitment from the government, which is one of the major barriers for institutional 
uncertainty-averse investors to enter the market. 
No incentives to 
increase efficiency 
of CHPs 
 The model does neither require nor incentivize improvements in the delivery of SAH. 
 It is not accessible to for-profit organizations, which are generally believed to be more 
efficient.  
 Rental rate of return does not increase. 
Timing  Model 1 is likely to be the fastest financing design to be implemented (out of 4 Models 
proposed by the working group), but it still requires 2-3 years before the benefits of the 
model (signs of a decrease in affordable housing shortfall) will be realized. 
Sources: ACOSS 2016, Hayhurst 2016, AHURI 2016a, ISA 2016, NAB 2016. 
 
Appendix 12: Low Income Housing Tax credit model in the US (LIHTC) 




The tax credit amount is calculated as follows: 
Tax Credit = α(development cost − land cost) + β(% of affordable units) + γ(credit rate) 
where alpha, beta and gamma are weights set by the government.  
Sources: Desai et al. 2010, Novogradac 2010, Wells Fargo 2016, JPMorgan 2016.  
Year 
established 
 Created in 1986.  
 Made permanent by Congress in 1993.  
Public sector 
role 
 The government allocates yearly the amount of tax-credits available for each state. 
Calculations are mainly based on the population of the state.  
 Each state housing agency has considerable liberty in setting additional rules within the state 
and select the winning projects. 
Types of tax 
Credits 
1. The “9% tax credit” is given to developers that meet the federal and state regulations in 
addition to not having any further subsidy from the government for that specific project. 
2. If the project is financed using private‐activity tax‐exempt bonds then the “4% tax credit” 
applies to keep into account the fact that other federal benefits are in place. 
Benefits of 
LIHTC for the 
bearer 
 A project newly constructed with no other federal benefit receives a tax credit which present 
value over 10 years equals to 70% of the qualified basis (i.e. expense). 
 All other tax credits entitle to 30% of the qualified basis (i.e. expense) in terms of present 
value over a 10-year period.  
Specific 
features of the 
Tax Credit 
 Tax credits can be sold to other private institutions such as syndicators (i.e. intermediaries) 
and then investors who provide equity to the project at a discount (e.g. 15% less than 
nominal value).  
 The intermediary in exchange provides access to capital which is often issued by large 
multinational corporations, banks or private investors (i.e. J.P. Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo). 
These investors are usually for profit.  
 Return on equity is expected in the form of capital gain and dividends as they consider the 






 The loss of the tax credit itself. This might happen when the dwelling does not comply with 
the eligibility rules set by the government (e.g. rent is higher than 30% of the local median 
income). In the US if the violations are amended in a certain time period then the tax credit 
remains valid. Otherwise, the tax credit will be lost and a penalty might arise.  
 The risks connected to any borrower. The ability of the housing provider to cover 
operational expenses and servicing the debt must be assessed. The fundamental underwriting 
considerations with LIHTC are the also found in market rate multifamily house lending.  
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